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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A STUDY ON THE FOODSERVICE INDUSTRY IN KOREA:  
 
BY 
 
Sojung Heo 
 
 
In spite of the short history of family restaurant in Korea, the industry has achieved robust 
growth for last 15 years.  It has been changing the landscape of the whole foodservice 
industry by forming new eating-out culture as well as by expanding the market volume of 
foodservice industry.   
 
Initially, the substantial growth has been driven by social, cultural and economical changes 
such as busier lifestyle, westernization of eating pattern and increase of income level in a 
booming economy.  Then after the Korean financial crisis, the industry as a whole has 
chased undifferentiated growth strategy to survive under severe competition.  However, 
profitability has been deteriorated because the growth stemmed from multi-store strategy. 
While most of the family restaurant companies have been focusing on volume without profits 
leading to financial difficulties, some successful players have captured the market by 
leveraging their core competence and have evolved from the second movers to market leaders.   
 
Among them, CJ Foodville Company has accomplished incredible performance by deploying 
a well-managed growth strategy.  First, the company focused on niche market by providing 
optimal value rather than the best one. Next, new brand launching has helped the company 
develop new market and cover various types of consumers’ values and needs. Finally, for the 
implementation of strategy, CJ Foodville achieved the alignment between business strategy 
and management practices.    
  
Although the business environment of family restaurant industry has been tougher than ever, I 
believe that some powerful leaders may obtain an opportunity to open new territory in the 
industry.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1-1 Thesis Objective 
One of the most common pitfalls for successful players when they face changes in 
business environment or in industrial evolution is that they often fail to respond 
effectively.  As the industry evolves, companies should deploy appropriate 
business strategies from production, marketing to human resource management.  
Moreover, all the management practices should be congruent with the business 
strategy for a sustainable growth.   
 
The concept of family restaurant was introduced in 1988 in Korea and since then 
many companies of this nature have been established.  In spite of the attention and 
investments, however, many companies including global franchises failed to secure 
a market in Korea.  The purpose of this thesis is to find what business strategy 
should be selected, how this should be carried out in alignment with other 
managerial elements in the family restaurant industry, and to give some 
implications on well-managed growth strategy through industry analysis and case 
study. 
 
1-2 Organization and Method of Research 
The thesis will, first provide an overview of the Korean foodservice industry, the 
family restaurant market and address its growth challenges.  It will then discuss 
the performances of major family restaurant players and their growth strategies.   
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Secondly, the case study on CJ Foodville will be reviewed in order to analyze what 
the company did to succeed in the industry and how it developed a well-managed 
strategy in response to the changing environment.  The case will provide the 
background of CJ Foodville, its financial performances, and some key success 
factors.  Finally, the direction for future growth will be added.     
 
In order to conduct this research, various types of literature were reviewed in order 
to approach the foodservice industry in a more objective way.  The sources 
included the academic books listed, a series of industry and business magazines, 
and annual reports as well as interviews with managers of CJ Foodville and rival 
companies. 
 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF FOODSERVICE INDUSTRY 
 
 
2-1 Industry Analysis 
There are several points to consider when eating out: taste, service, price, 
atmosphere, accessibility, and hygiene.  Among them, a combination of taste and 
service has taken an important role to deliver the best value to customers, and 
workforce is at the core of value creation.  On the other hand, as the industry 
grows, various styles of restaurants were introduced in order to adapt to consumers’ 
changing preference.  
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Classification of Foodservice Industry 
The foodservice industry can be categorized into institutional foodservice (meal 
service business) and commercial foodservice1.  The commercial foodservice can 
be divided into three sub-categories: full service restaurants, quick service 
restaurants and take-out restaurants according to the provided service and products.  
 
 
 
               
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Classification of Foodservice Industry 
                                                 
1 Full service restaurants – provide meal and drinks with full service by wait staff 
at mid-high price, including family restaurants and fine dining restaurants.  
2 Family restaurants – serve various kinds of meal and drinks to usually families 
and younger generation in a cozy ambience with parking space. 
3 Quick service restaurants – provide limited meal and drinks at cheap price 
through self-service or drive-through, used interchangeably with fast-food 
restaurants  
4 Take-out restaurants – provide fresh sandwiches, store-baked breads to eat at 
home or other places 
5 Meal service business – contract catering service to institutions such as hospitals, 
schools, army facilities and companies. 
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Growing Industry 
For the past 25 years, the Korean foodservice business has become a large industry 
by achieving an annual growth of almost 20%.  The total revenue has risen from 
431 billion won to 40 trillion won, between 1976 and 2002.  The rapid growth has 
been driven by demographical, social, and economic changes such as aging 
population, busier lifestyle, and increase of disposable income level among Korean 
consumers.   
 
Aging society.  As Korea becomes mature and aging (see Appendix A), there will 
be more spending on food service industry.  The population of over 50 years old, 
21.3% of the total population in 2002, is projected to increase to almost 50% by 
2022.  In 2002, the birth rate was 1.17, which was the lowest among the O.E.C.D 
countries; the total dependency ratio was also declining (SERI report, October 
2003). This senior generation will emerge as a main consuming power and rely on 
more prepared meal and foodservice. 
 
Increasing expenditure on foodservice.  The ratio of eating out on food and 
beverage has risen from 6% to 41.9 % between 1983 and 2002. (Table 1.)   
Expenditure on eating out also increased significantly from 7,000 won to 200,000 
won per household.  This means that Koreans’ eating habits have been changing: 
less are eating at home and more are eating out.  In addition to increasing income 
level, the status of working women boosted the eating-out expenditure.  
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Table 1.  Expenditure on Food and Meals outside of Korean Household 
Year ConsumptionExpenditures
Food and Beverages
   Won    Increase
Meals Outside 
   Won    Increase MO to FB
1983 271,015 106,859 7,045  6.6%
1984 294,396 112,627 5% 7,947 13% 7.1%
1985 317,025 118,898 6% 8,871 12% 7.5%
1986 348,193 126,658 7% 11,316 28% 8.9%
1987 400,031 141,216 11% 17,106 51% 12.1%
1988 467,636 162,827 15% 22,550 32% 13.8%
1989 594,287 189,532 16% 36,742 63% 19.4%
1990 685,662 220,834 17% 44,844 22% 20.3%
1991 818,340 258,610 17% 55,335 23% 21.4%
1992 941,949 285,726 10% 66,897 21% 23.4%
1993 1,020,953 301,675 6% 79,630 19% 26.4%
1994 1,140,432 341,574 13% 97,795 23% 28.6%
1995 1,265,890 367,080 7% 115,745 18% 31.5%
1996 1,426,853 409,502 12% 136,569 18% 33.4%
1997 1,489,541 427,458 4% 155,025 14% 36.3%
1998 1,316,222 365,859 -14% 122,756 -21% 33.6%
1999 1,478,876 412,056 13% 146,363 19% 35.5%
2000 1,632,298 447,018 8% 175,990 20% 39.4%
2001 1,762,124 463,582 4% 190,480 8% 41.1%
2002 1,834,812 481,049 4% 201,543 6% 41.9%
Source: Korea National Statistical Office  
 
Intense Competition Across The Industry 
The industry will face a new breed of tough competition as manufacturers, 
distributors and even grocers try to grab the market opportunity.  Above all, the 
home meal replacement1 market will become larger than any other sector as 
consumers prefer food prepared away from home that is suitable for at-home 
                                                 
1 Home meal replacements – Freshly prepared meal solutions, which are 
primarily consumed at home or off-premise. 
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dining.  There are huge potential rivals from brand new family restaurants, 
(“Huerea” of Hyundai Gnet), meal service companies, (“Carnastation” of 
Sinsaegye food system, “Foodwon” of CJ Foodsystem), professional 
Banchangagye, (“Days” of Doosan KFC running Burger King), specific restaurant 
specializing in noodle, pasta or ethnic food, (“Nzel” of Pulmuwon ECMD), 
chicken and pasta restaurant (“Mom’s Touch” of Popeye’s).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Red pin 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Dynamic environment in Foodservice industry (Ranked by volume) 
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Severe Labor Shortage 
While manpower is more important than any other industry, labor shortages 
become more severe as the traditional labor pool shrinks and industrial turnover 
rate reaches up to 30%.  Therefore, companies should spend more money on 
hiring, training, retaining their employees.  According to McKinsey research, in 
American companies of this industry, the difference between operators with low 
turnover and high turnover is a 25% improvement in costs.  Employees with high 
loyalty are core asset to achieve cost advantage. 
 
Labor-Oriented Industry  
In the foodservice industry, food, because of its perishable nature, should be 
consumed as soon as produced.  Even if the products are supplied through a semi-
processed treatment in some cases, it is not easy to stock them for a long time.  
Therefore, the ability to coordinate between demand and supply is absolutely 
needed.  At the same time, foods are provided not only in the form of products but 
also in the form of service.  Service has an instant affect on how consumers think 
of the quality of food.  As such, it is vital to have skillful cooperation between 
back-of-house (products) and front-of-house (service) workers. If job conflicts 
among employees are reduced, they will work more productively and efficiently 
and maximize customer satisfaction.   
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2-2 Key players of the Korean Family Restaurant Market 
At the introduction stage of family restaurants, there were only a few operators 
such as Coco’s, T.G.I.F and Skylark, and the total sales volume was not big enough 
to make profits.  There were many entries between 1994 and 1997 (see Appendix 
B).  Although there was a discontinuity in market expansion caused by the Korean 
financial crisis in 1997, the family restaurant industry has achieved robust growth 
for the last 15 years.  In 2002, the market volume of family restaurants reached 
380 billion won based on sales revenue of the top 7 companies.  Market 
expansion was mainly due to a competitive multi-store strategy.  Most of the 
revenue growth that occurred has come from building more stores.  While most of 
the family restaurant companies have been focusing on volume without profits 
leading to financial difficulties, some successful players have captured the market 
by leveraging their core competence, and have evolved from second movers to 
market leaders.  As the industry became mature, most of the players launched 
many second brands for niche markets to create a new profit model.      
 
2-2-1 COCO’S 
In 1988, Midopa Departmentstore established Coco’s as the first family restaurant 
in the domestic market through technical alliance with Coco’s Japan.  Since then, 
the domestic foodservice market, which was dominated by fast food restaurants, 
has been reorganized toward family restaurants. Coco’s was originally based in the 
US, but the one established in Korea looked Japanese in style. The atmosphere was 
cozy and quiet, and the menu was adapted for Korean taste.  For this reason, 
 9
Coco’s soon became a familiar name. 
 
Despite having been recognized as a pioneer in the family restaurant industry, 
Coco’s lost the opportunity to advance to a higher position.  When entering the 
market in 1992, T.G.I.F set its position with the concept of casual dining.  Coco’s 
even until then did not have a clear target market.  In the mid and high end market, 
the dominant players included T.G.I.F, Ponderosa, Marche, Beniggan's and Outback 
Steakhouse.  When Coco’s decided to set its position in the lower and mid end, 
Skylark had already penetrated the market.  When it comes to franchising strategy, 
Coco’s was expanded through franchising rather than company-owned restaurants.  
Its franchise system made the equation of product and service difficult. 
Consequently, its sales volume has decreased continuously from 27 billion won in 
1999 to 16 billion won in 2002.  The net loss was 8.7 billion won only in 2002.   
Coco’s                                           Unit: won in millions 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Capital  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000
Revenue 27,000 24,709 19,250 16,602
Net profit -8,294 -6,556 -11,413 -8,696
Employees    949    949    744
No. Of Store     31     29      35    20
 
2-2-2 T.G.I.F  
T.G.I. Friday's set its business target on the younger generation in the twenties who 
were familiar with international food and culture.  It also accommodated a cozy 
ambience for families with children.  The company provided high end products 
for high-income customers so that T.G.I.F grew incessantly and maintained its top-
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notch position before the economic crisis.  The company was ranked as the best 
family restaurant franchise in terms of brand power in a survey conducted by the 
Korea Management Association in 2001.   
 
Its competitive advantage lay in not only providing the best food.  It made eating 
“fun” and offered the best quality of service.  From its vivid red and white stripe 
table covers, uniforms decorated with various badges and mascots to the 
bartenders’ entertainment, its customers could enjoy new cultural experiences.  
The company invented the idea of customer satisfaction called “customer delight 
action program”.  One of these service differentiations is the “puppy dog service”, 
that is, the waiters and waitresses kneel or squat rather than stand when they 
receive orders from customers, bringing their eyes level to those of the customers. 
The service was benchmarked not only by the food service industry but also by 
hotels and airlines.   
 
However, as many followers imitated its service practices, the difference from its 
competitors became blurred.  Although the company kept a leading position in 
terms of brand power and market share, the increase rate of revenue dropped from 
11.99 to -7.01% in 2002.   
 
To attract more customers, the company opened more outlets up to 25.  At the 
same time, it had co-marketing with competitors to expand its market and with 
telecommunication and credit card companies, offering up to 25% discount, in 
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order to survive in severe price competition.  In spite of these efforts, the sales 
volume has been lagging for several years and decreased by 6 billion won down to 
78 billion won in 2002.  Net profit on sales was only 1.34% because the company 
did not have cost leadership.  The cost of goods sold and labor on revenue were 
excessive, taking almost 50% and 25% of sales respectively.  In May 2002, the 
Lotte Group, which is a dominant position in food, tourism and merchandizing 
industries, acquired the company.   
T.G.I Friday’s                                      Unit: won in millions 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Sales Profit 6,000  6,000 7,020
Revenue 38,000 75,250 84,270 78,360
Sales Profit  2,054  1,457    641
No. Of Store 12 17 21 20
 
 
2-2-3 VIPS & SKYLARK 
In 1994, starting as a business unit in CJ Corporation, CJ Foodville has been 
growing to run 68 family restaurants and 10 take-out food outlets in 2003. As of 
2002, the company posed 69 billion won in sales revenue, 45% up from the 
previous year.  Its first brand Skylark seemed to follow the format of Coco’s in 
terms of menu, restaurant interior, and price and target customers.  However, the 
revenue of Skylark increased up to nearly 32 billion won in 8 years, twice that of 
Coco’s since Skylark had unwavering target market and business strategy.   
 
VIPS, its second but luxurious brand, was developed to expand its business area 
towards the high-end market.  Although its format imitated that of Sizzler, VIPS 
 12
grew to create 36 billion won from its 13 restaurants in 2002.   
 
After spinning off, the company expanded significantly the market by acquiring 
foreign restaurant chain Ponderosa and local franchise E-together so that it could 
cover most of the major cities across the nation by adding 24 new Skylark outlets 
in only 2002.  CJ could initiate cost leadership through economy of scale attained 
from the multi-store strategy.  At the same time, CJ has developed a new market 
by introducing new brands HanCook specializing in Korean food, and Delcucina 
for the take-out market. 
CJ Foodville                                       Unit: won in millions 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Capital 17,585  17,585 17,585
Revenue 30,300    443,00 48,340 69,940
Sales Profit  3,690  4,362
Skylark store 18 21 30 54
VIPS store 3 3 8 12
 
2-2-4 OUTBACK  
Through a huge discount program, with the catch phrase “serving at the price of 5 
years ago”, Outback Steak House gained over 55 billion won sales volume in 2002.  
Although the company was one of late entries, established in 1997, it became the 
most profitable companies in this industry, recording the highest rate of sales profit 
for the last 2 years.  Its revenue increase was 40% in 2002. 
   
It is imperceptible to recognize the difference of its target market, price, menu and 
atmosphere of outlets from those of its competitors.  However, it succeeded in 
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differentiating through its unique “grassroots marketing” strategy.   Grassroots 
marketing meant the company encouraged community involvement through several 
nonprofit activities.  The company spends 0.5% of its sales for the community by 
supporting or sponsoring community activities such as sports games, food festivals, 
and various community events.  The company organized a “Kids tour program” 
for children to visit the store and have free meal.  In order to develop community 
market in direct, each restaurant visits or invites target customers and provides free 
lunch and drinks for potential market.  This community-oriented marketing 
created positive image on the company and also created the instant sales increase.  
 
Outback provided ownership opportunities at the individual restaurant level.  
Ownership opportunities for restaurant-level general managers were atypical in the 
industry.  However at Outback, a restaurant general manager can invest up to 20 
million won for about 5 percent share of the net profit from the restaurant as a 
monthly bonus.  Low-level managers of individual store also can earn 0.01% of 
the net profit except for their basic salaries. At the same time, the company 
empowers the general managers.  The general manager of each store had sole 
rights to evaluate employees and decide their wage according to the performance.  
As a result, outbackers are highly motivated and enthusiastic to increase the value 
of their restaurant.  In the manner, the company can be flexible in response to the 
need of its customers because each restaurant can develop new menus and choose 
appropriate promotion that fit it.       
Those programs including grassroots marketing, ownership, and empowerment 
 14
helped the company expand the market in a short period.  The number of 
restaurants increased by 300% for the last 3 years.  Outback was ranked as the 
best family restaurant franchise in terms of service quality index in a survey 
conducted by the Korea Standard Association in 2002 and 2003.  
Outback Steakhouse                             Unit: won in millions 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Capital 1,922  1,922  1,922
Revenue 7,500 13,612 32,786 54,799
Sales Profit -15    1,680  2,970
Employees    852  1,456
No. Of Store 3      8     17     23
 
2-2-5 OTHER PLAYERS  
Most of the family restaurant companies already stepped in new markets such as 
take-out or specializing restaurants.  It was essential to develop new business area 
since existing market was mature and the market share among competitors has 
been stabilized for the last 3 years. 
 
Amoje, affiliate of Hotel Amiga, owned family restaurant Marche, take-out 
restaurant Café Amoje and Chinese restaurant Uncle Wings.  Marche means 
market place, in which customers walk around and enjoy watching their food being 
cooked in front of them.  Each food section becomes a kind of a menu itself, 
kitchen and a place to have fun for the customers.  The customers choose and 
deliver their own food by self-service.  But self-service is not the only merit.  By 
bringing out the back line jobs to the front line, the company could eliminate 
service process and cost that other family restaurants usually have and enhance 
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credibility for hygiene and safety. 
Amoje                                            Unit: won in millions 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Capital  1,300  4,300  4,300
Revenue 11,000 25,671 42,000 50,179
Sales Profit  1,282  2,569  1,558
No. Of Store 4     7     10     10
 
Bennigan’s was one of the top 4 companies, established by Tongyang 
Confectionery in 1995.  It earned 70 billion won from its 14 franchises in 2002.  
Although it maintained an average of over 30% of annual sales increase for the last 
3 years, its profitability has been eroded.   After spinning off from its mother 
company, the company acquired an events company “Jemiro”.  By co-marketing 
with world-class performances or events, it placed emphasis on “culture 
marketing”.  In 2003, a large-scale Chinese dining restaurant “Mr. Chow” was 
introduced in Chungdamdong with total construction cost of 6 billion won.  
Bennigan’s                                        Unit: won in millions 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Revenue 28,600 40,300 49,212 61,861
Sales Profit  5,116  5,469
No. Of Store 9 10     13     14
 
Sun@Food consists of four brands: Tony Romas, Spagettia, Mad for Garlic and 
Pepper Lunch.  Tony Romas is a family restaurant specializing in barbeque rib 
and Pepper Lunch is in between full service restaurant and quick service restaurant.  
In spite of adding two more outlets in 2002, Tony Romas’ sales increase was lower 
than 20% of the industry average.  Its revenue was 14 trillion won from 6 outlets. 
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Sun @ Food *         Unit: won in millions 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Capital  1,500  2,500  2,500
Revenue 7,500 18,231 23,844 26,908
Sales Profit  1,389   2,058  2,407
Net Profit   701  1,196  1,557
Employees   315    532   337
Tony Romas 
store 
4     4      4     6
* including Tony Romas, Spagettia, Mad for Garlic and Pepper Lunch 
 
Sizzler, launched by Daehan Confectionery in 1995, earned 12 billion won from 4 
branches and invented a second brand, Elmon Tray for the take-out market. 
Sizzler                                            Unit: won in millions 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Capital 1,600  1,600
Revenue 6,700 8,000 9,851 13,335
Sales Profit 1,242  1,567
Net Profit 521  1,072
No. Of Store 2   3    5      4
 
 
3. CASE STUDY OF CJ FOODVILLE 
 
 
3-1 CJ Group 
 
3-1-1 History of CJ  
CJ Corporation, mother company of the CJ Group, was the first manufacturing 
affiliate of the Samsung Group, which was established by founding chairman 
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Byung-Chull Lee in 1938. Though Mr. Lee’s little business was in trade, selling 
dried Korean fish, vegetables, and fruit to Manchuria and Beijing, Samsung 
eventually had its own flour mills and confectionery machines, moving on to 
manufacturing and sales operations, ultimately becoming the root of modern global 
corporation by starting CJ Corporation.   
 
In 1953, when Korea was still marred by the Korean War, CJ Corporation made a 
big business by refining and selling sugar at a half price of imported one.  While 
Samsung expanded its business areas to insurance, textile, media, electronics, 
advertisement and even aviation industry, CJ Corp. was the backbone of Samsung 
and an abundant financial source.  Furthermore, CJ Corp. was called the “military 
academy of Samsung”, fostering the talented staff until the company was split off 
from the Samsung Group in 1993. 
 
Mr. Jay-Hyun Lee, the eldest grandson of the founder, and the current chairman 
and CEO of CJ Group, took over CJ Corporation in 1993.  Since then Mr. Lee 
have launched various business lines to cover media, entertainment, home 
shopping and logistics as well as its traditional food and food service and bio 
pharmacy.  His business strategy was very similar with his grandfather’s in terms 
of that both of them extended their businesses through diversification.  However, 
the younger Lee demonstrated to be a rather risk taker and much aggressive in 
order to enter the new businesses rapidly. 
On his third year, he became the second biggest shareholder of DreamWorks with 
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US$300,000,000 equity investment and began the entertainment business. The deal 
meant a big change of conceptualization for CJ, challenging to lift the limits of a 
fixed image of over 40-year-old in the food business.  Although CJ has not 
received enough dividends, it took the distribution right in Asia of DreamWorks 
with the position of investor.  CJ then began CJ CGV (CJ Golden Village), a 
multiplex theater business in 1996, CJ Entertainment, a movie producer and 
distributor in 1997 and acquired Music Network (CJ Media).  Until 1999 CJ 
focused on diversification of its business units - acquired Samgoo Shopping (home 
shopping), Korea First Investment & Trust (a finance business), established CJ 
Frozen Foods Company, CJ GLS (a total logistics provider), CJ Food System (a 
meal service company).  When CJ acquired 39 Shopping in 2000, CEO Lee found 
that it was the time for a change.   
 
Its new slogan “Only One” meant that the company would focus on its core 
business with core competence.  With this principle, CJ divested whatever 
business units were irrelevant to its strategic business.  CJ, on the other hand, 
decided to spin off most of the business sectors into independent companies in 
2000.  Finally, CJ set four core business categories: food and food service, bio 
pharmacy, media and entertainment, and home shopping and logistics.  
 
3-1-2 Affiliated companies  
All of CJ’s businesses from a traditional manufacturing to service and culture 
industry have helped CJ reach its goal of providing health (food and food service), 
 19
pleasure (entertainment and media), and convenience (home shopping) to its 
customers and shared their capabilities 
Food and Food Service Business: This business includes from food material, 
processed food, restaurants, and food supply business.  A cash cow CJ 
Corporation has produced a lot of food materials for 50 years including sugar, flour, 
and oil. The sugar business holds almost 48 % portion of the domestic market.  It 
also leads the processed food market through expanding its product lines from 
seasonings, retort food, and seamed rice to processed meat.  Its first new business, 
CJ Foodville is a leading family restaurant.  For the health food market, 
nutritional food and vitamins were introduced in 2002.  Its bakery franchise Tous 
Les Jours has more than 300 shops.  CJ FoodSystem has been specializing in 
contract catering service by serving 700,000 meals a day and also offers food 
materials distribution through restaurants, hotels, and schools.  MorningWell 
covers the frozen food market, and Haechandle produces Oriental food seasonings 
including hot pepper paste and soy sauce products.  
Bio Engineering Business: As a pharmaceutical-specialized company, CJ has 
accumulated bio fermentation technology for a long time. The competitiveness of 
bio products helped food business develop innovative products. 
Entertainment and Media Business: Starting with the equity investment from 
DreamWorks, CJ Entertainment has become a leading producer and distributor of 
entertainment products in the domestic market.  It produced many successful 
movies including “JSA” and “Moosa”.  It is now advancing into the Southeast 
Asian markets.  CJ CGV operates a total of 18 multiplex theaters across the nation. 
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Distribution Business: CJ Home Shopping, as another cash cow in the CJ group, 
earned 1.4 trillion won in sales and 44 billion won in net profit in 2002.    
     
3-1-3 Foodservice Task Force Team  
In 1994, CJ Corporation sought a new business line after separating from Samsung 
in order to eliminate the limited image of food material-related company. At the 
time, the family restaurant market was emerging with its potential growth 
opportunity in a booming economy.  Because of low entry level, many restaurants 
were already established, which were not affluent enough to play across the nation.  
Since CJ had core competence in food manufacturing and also had financial 
capability provided by mother company, it was natural that CJ chose to run a 
family restaurant business.  Task force team was created with most of the staffs 
from planning, marketing to constructing recruited through internal job posting.   
 
They targeted families consisting of young parents and their children with Korean 
taste tailored menu at low and mid prices ranging from 4,000 won to 15,000 won. 
(Figure 3.)  Although CJ made a technical alliance at 2% royalty on its sales with 
Skylark in Japan, it was much lower than that of competitors who paid 3-4% 
license fee and their relationship was much looser than that of rival companies.  
This favorable condition of contract helped CJ save the cost of sales and operation, 
and renew and develop its store design, logo and new menus independently and 
quickly in the future.  
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Figure 3. Value proposition 
Interior of Skylark was designed to be practical and functional with clear store 
image.  The success of this industry is largely dependent on its location where 
family can drive and spend one or two hours dining. Traditionally, the location 
should be near residential areas, shopping facilities or suburb with enough parking 
spaces. Finally, CJ opened its first outlet in Nonhyundong, a residential area in 
Kangnam, the southern part of Seoul.  
 
 
3-2 CJ Foodville 
 
3-2-1 First Round (1994-1999) 
After successfully penetrating the market, CJ started to develop new business line 
that could diversify business risk. In March 1997, CJ launched the new brand VIPS, 
a native brand for the high-end market.   
Unfortunately, however, the whole industry flagged due to the Korean financial 
 
Fastfood
Skylark/Coco’s
Fine dining
 
Casual dining
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crisis in November 1997.  As the expenditure of eating out shrank, CJ’s restaurant 
business unit was in deficit also.  There were intense conflicts and disputes on 
whether the business should go on or not.  Only one outlet was newly opened in 
1998.  Some staffs including those in construction and sales division were 
redeployed into other business units in CJ Corporation.  However, CEO Lee did 
not give up. Instead of divesting the restaurant business, CJ strengthened its 
competitiveness through strict profit and loss management as well as 
reorganization.   
 
While restructuring the profit formula, CJ downsized the number of regular jobs 
and increased temporary or contingent employees for new openings.  The ratio of 
contingent employees over regular employees per outlet became 9 to 1 at some 
point.  The common denominator among contingent employees is that they don’t 
have the security or stability that permanent employees have.  As such, they don’t 
identify with the organization or display the commitment that other employees 
have (Stephen P. Robbins, Organizational behavior).  In order to motivate 
temporary workers, CJ gave the opportunity to obtain permanent status.  As 
permanent employees were selected from the pool of temporaries, they worked 
hard in hopes of becoming permanent.  
 
To improve the productivity and the quality of service, CJ declared its 3S 
movement: simplification, standardization and specialization.   All the job 
manuals were simplified so even temporaries could follow them and the whole job 
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process was integrated automatically by using technical device.  For example, 
when the waiting staff clicks a menu on his/her PDA, the culinary team can prepare 
the food at the same time.  The standardization of food materials and products 
removed the unleveled quality of service, mainly caused by multi-store strategy.  
From the central kitchen, all food were prepared and delivered to each store to keep 
the same quality.  Each store could focus on only customer service. 
 
CJ implemented more aggressive approach called “breakfast program” to appeal 
exclusively to the neighbor community.   Menus were expanded with side dishes 
such as kimchi, seaweed soup and rice.  The introduction of the breakfast program 
increased 5% of the sales by attracting more customers for non-peak time.   
 
3-2-2 Second Round (2000-2002) 
CJ Foodville grew to have 54 Skylark restaurants and 12 VIPS steak restaurants 
across the nation, generating 69 billion won of revenue with 3.2 billion won of net 
profit in 2002 through multi-store, multi-brand strategies. (Table 2.)  
 
In 2000, CJ Corporation spun off its restaurant businesses into a new company, 
named Foodville. Although CJ’s financial performance was improving, its brand 
power and market share were not as high as those of the competitors.  Consumers 
began to demand healthier foods, greater variety and service in nontraditional 
locations such as grocery stores, airports, and outdoor events.  This forced it to 
expand menu offerings and to investigate nontraditional distribution channels and 
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restaurant designs.   
 
Table 2.  Financial performance of CJ Foodville                   Unit: won  
 2001 2002 
Revenue 48,338,841,942 69,935,217,536
Cost and Expanses 
Cost of revenues 17,702,133,791 24,811,468,719
Labor & other related expanses 10,811,262,258 15,887,334,286 
R & D expanses     
License fee     
General & administrative expanses 
154,381,570
588,951,112
15,493,330,418 
350,511,966
707,205,638
23,817,159,845
Income from operation 3,688,782,793 4,361,537,082
Non-operating income 625,103,234 544,507,466
Non-operating expense 300,780,991 384,321,782
Income before tax 4,013,105,036 4,521,722,766 
Net income 2,769,921,673 3,211,073,014 
Earnings per common share 913 788
 
One of CJ’s most significant problems was that it was hard to find a place for 
freestanding restaurants.  Fewer sites were available for new construction and 
those sites, because of their increased cost, were driving profit margins down.  
Therefore, CJ initiated a new distribution strategy.  It focused on building smaller 
restaurants in nontraditional outlets such as airports, shopping malls and inside 
small buildings. In order to minimize a fixed investment on building cost, the 
owner of the building or space was participated as an investor and CJ shared the 
income according to the sales. 
 
In this growth stage, CJ gained the market through M&A, acquiring American 
brand Ponderosa in 2001 and local franchise Etogether from Emart in 2002. This 
acquisition provided the support to expand its branches nationwide.  Strategic 
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alliance with Emart, one of the biggest discount stores in Korea helped it attract 
more customers not only because it could save time and cost for constructing new 
outlets but also because it was more accessible for customers by being located 
inside Emart.  Skylark became the biggest family restaurant in terms of the 
number of stores by opening 24 new outlets in 2002.  The multi-store strategy 
resulted in economies of scale leading cost leadership. 
 
Besides Skylark and VIPS, CJ broadened the range of its foodservice business by 
adding take-out restaurant “Delcucina” to meet the changing customer demand for 
fresh and healthy meal.   
 
As number of outlets was increased, quality control became an urgent problem to 
solve.  CJ devised the idea of holding a “morning market” every month in a bid to 
control the quality of food.  “We display samples or photos of food ingredients 
and raw materials that our customers claimed to be unsanitary or not fresh and ask 
the suppliers to buy them back.  Enhanced quality builds up trust between us and 
suppliers, thus removing the need of closer inspections, which takes up a lot of 
time.” (Korea Herald, August 11, 2003)   
 
On the other hand, CJ kept no advertisement and TV commercial policy since it 
believed that advertisement does not boost sales.  The reputation was accumulated 
and delivered by word of mouth.  Instead, it diverted the resource to improving 
food quality and service. Investment on R&D doubled from 150 million won to 
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350 million won between 2001 and 2002.  
 
Through efficient management practices, CJ could keep lower labor costs at 20% 
of its revenue than the industry average of 25 % (Table 3.) and achieved an average 
4.59% of net income higher than the industry’s average of 0.79%. (KIS report)   
Table 3.   Ratio of Labor Cost to Revenue                         Unit: % 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent 11.5 11.6 10.8 8.8 8.6 9.9 10.5
Part Timer 9.9 10.1 10.2 11.0 12.3 11.1 10.7
Total 21.4 21.7 21.0 19.8 20.9 21.0 21.2
Source: CJ Foodville  
 
3-2-3 Third Round (2003-   ) 
While other competitors recorded less than 20% sales increase in the first half of 
2003 over the same period of the previous year, CJ gained 40% increase.  CJ had 
more diverse businesses by launching new brands and set various strategies 
according to the product cycle of each brand.   
 
First, for Skylark, CJ used concept renewal in order to prolong product life.  CJ 
thought its existing image would be a trap for further growth. “The food service 
industry is very similar to the fashion industry, which incessantly requires 
renovation and should be responsive to the changing needs of its customers,” a CJ 
Foodville manager said.  Skylark removed its logos from outside signboards and 
upgraded its image from a low-end restaurant to a high-end “casual restaurant”.  
Interior design was changed to resemble an American home.  30% of the total 
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outlets were already renovated.  To improve the menu selection, CJ held customer 
menu competitions to encourage customer participation and to stay more close to 
customer taste.     
 
Secondly, though the taste of Koreans have become more westernized or globalized, 
they still prefer the traditional foods. (Table 4.) CJ Foodville developed a new 
format of Korean family restaurant.  While the existing family restaurant industry 
appears to have reached a mature phase and is not expected to grow as fast as it did 
in the past, the volume of family restaurant segment took up less than 1% of the 
entire foodservice industry.  New brand launching for Korean food became 
imperative for capturing new sources of growth.  “HanCook” is a family 
restaurant specializing in Korean food for the mid-high end market.  The Korean 
food market takes almost 50% of total foodservice industry, 20,000 billion won.  
Given the assumption that the ratio of commercialized Korean family restaurants to 
Korean food market will gain 10% of foodservice sales, based on the ratio of the 
commercialized family restaurants over western food market, the projected volume  
Table 4.  Korean’s Taste Profile                                  Unit: % 
Age Korean Japanese Chinese Western Fast Food 
10-19 30.5 5.7 12.4 19.0 32.4
20-29 59.5 1.2 6.0 10.7 22.6
30-39 65.6 6.9 8.1 11.9 7.5
40-49 61.3 13.3 10.0 10.0 5.3
Over 50 64.7 42.9 5.9 5.9 5.9
Total 56.2 7.9 9.1 12.4 14.3
Source: Korea Food Research Institute, 1996 
can amount to 2,000 billion won.  Although this business is in its infancy, it has 
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the potential opportunity and will help lengthen the business cycle of CJ 
foodservice.  
 
As the domestic market became mature, VIPS restaurants chose globalization 
strategy.  CJ registered its trademark in China and in other South Asian countries, 
including the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand.  Also CJ developed a new 
channel in order to create a different market place.  For instance, VIPS started 
selling various kinds of source through the on-line market.   
 
 
3-3 Key Success Factors 
CJ Foodville Company has accomplished an incredible performance for the last 3 
years by deploying well-managed growth strategy.  Above all, the alignment 
between business strategy and management practices made CJ achieve sustainable 
growth.    
 
3-3-1 Positioning 
First, the company focused on a niche market by providing optimal value rather 
than the best one.  According to a series of surveys, surprisingly, CJ Foodville 
hardly ranked as the best family restaurant while T.G.I.Friday’s and Outback have 
been quite often at the top in terms of their taste, service, atmosphere and variety of 
menu.  However, CJ got the highest points in the field of customer satisfaction in 
terms of value to money.  CJ did not follow the dominant concept of the high-end 
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family restaurants in Korea, where most of them pay high royalty rate to American 
or European brands and serve western food and drinks.  Instead, it had a clear 
target market for the families consisting of young parents and their children with 
Korean taste tailored menu at low and mid prices before the market was diversified. 
CJ then segmented the market and set higher position as the customers’ taste and 
attitude were more customized and individualized.    
 
3-3-2 New Brand Strategy 
Brand means not only products but also market in business development of CJ 
Foodville.  Competitiveness of new brand stemmed from the technologies, know-
how or business model of existing brand.  As the industry evolved, new brand 
launching has helped the company develop new market and cover various types of 
consumers’ values and needs. As a result, diversification as a growth strategy have 
reinforced the company image and extended business life cycle.      
 
3-3-3 Management Practices  
All the management practices were congruent with its business strategy in order to 
maximize the result.  In order to achieve cost leadership, CJ acquired E-together 
and opened its outlets inside Emart.  This multi-store strategy reduced the cost of 
production and distribution through economy of scale.  From the central kitchen, 
Skylark introduced a fast food concept to enhance productivity.  VIPS restaurant 
reinforced salad bar section, which created higher margin than main dish.  For 
promotion, it has no advertisement policy to reduce management expanse.  At the 
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human resource side, it downsized the organization and increased part timers, 
however, CJ kept the quality of products and service and delivered the best value 
for money at the same time.  By providing hiring opportunities to contingent 
workers, it increased retention rate and decreased turnover rate.  Turnover was 
reduced by 36% down to 219% for part timers this year and 70% of new regular 
workers came from the pool of temporary workers.  CJ could reduce the cost of 
selection, replacements and retention.  Furthermore, CJ saved the cost of training 
and education because the employees were already well trained.  This workforce 
with full of loyalty created the core advantage for further growth.  
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
As this thesis mentioned above, the market of Korean family restaurant has 
expanded rapidly for the last 15 years.  The continuous increase of disposable 
income level led Korean consumers to spend more money on eating out.  As 
consumers’ eating habits became diversified and customized, many second brands 
appeared for niche market.  Changes in consumer taste and value will fuel a 
dramatic shift on the family restaurant industry from low-end market to high-end 
market.   
 
On the other hand, the competitive intensity in family restaurants continues to 
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increase, as the industry is invaded from all sides by other business segments such 
as food material manufacturers, meal distributors and retailers.  Therefore, the 
family restaurant companies should develop innovative responses to meet the 
changing environments and to capture the benefits of this growth.   
 
Although most of the family restaurants recorded rapid growth, they stretched out 
through aggressive multi-store strategy, focusing on volume game without profits.  
One of the most significant tasks is to have a well-managed growth strategy 
through restructuring the profit formula and to implement the strategy through 
elaborate management practices from production and distribution to marketing and 
human resource management.    
 
Although the business environment of the family restaurant industry has been 
tougher than ever, I believe that some powerful leaders may obtain an opportunity 
to open new territory in the foodservice industry  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Aging population in Korea                           
Population items 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 
Total population 47,639,618 48,948,463 49,954,138 50,518,349 50,682,718
Increase rate: ‰ 0.6 0.46 0.31 0.11 0
0-14 years old 9,792,573 9,171,846 8,171,560 7,395,633 6,832,336
 20.6 18.7 16.4 14.6 13.5
15-64 years old 34,074,591 34,984,188 36,091,847 36,336,556 35,447,259
 71.5 71.5 72.2 71.9 69.9
Over 64 years  3,772,454 4,792,429 5,690,731 6,786,160 8,403,123
 7.9 9.8 11.4 13.4 16.6
Median age  32.9 35.8 38.6 41.3 43.8
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Introduction of Family Restaurant in Korea 
Entry year Brand 
1988 Coco’s 
1992 T.G.I.Fridays 
1993 Ponderosa 
1994 Skylark 
 Dennys 
1995 Bennigan’s 
 Sizzler 
 Tony Romas 
1996 Chillis 
 Italianis 
 Marche 
1997 UNO 
 VIPS 
 Outback Steakhouse 
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